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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper surveys those decisions issued by the U.S.
Court of International Trade (CIT) and the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) from November
of 1992 to early October of 1994 which concern the
antidumping and countervailing duty determinations of the
United States Department of Commerce (Commerce). We have
not attempted to discuss all such decisions of the past two
years but have instead chosen those cases which we believe are
of interest to attorneys attending the 1994 CIT Judicial Con-
ference and to trade practitioners generally, as well as those
opinions which particularly pique our own interests or are not
being discussed at the Conference by other panelists. Where
appropriate, we have grouped our discussion of cases by issue.
* Senior Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel for Import Administration, Office
of the General Counsel, United States Department of Commerce.
** Attorney Advisor, Office of Chief Counsel for Import Administration, Office
of the General Counsel, United States Department of Commerce.
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II. THE 'VAT TAx" DILEMMA
How to treat value-added (VAT) or indirect taxes under
the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws has long
been a thorny problem. Two Federal Circuit decisions issued
last year laid to rest some major aspects of that dilemma,'
while several CIT decisions have since addressed subsidiary
issues.2 In addition, a third Federal Circuit decision addressed
the related "physical incorporation test" for treatment of rebat-
ed domestic taxes in antidumping cases.'
In Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United States,4 the Federal
Circuit held that Commerce may not deduct from foreign mar-
ket value (FMV) those foreign taxes imposed on merchandise
sold in the home country, but must instead add those taxes to
the price at which the merchandise is sold in the U.S. (United
States price or USP). The appellate court based its holding on
its reading of title 19 of the U.S. Code,' stating that:
Title 19 explicitly requires Commerce to increase USP by the
amount of tax that the exporting country would have as-
sessed on the merchandise if it had been sold in the home
market .... Section 1677a(d)(1)(C), the section dealing with
tax adjustments, does not provide for any adjustment to FMV
to correct for tax-related distortion of the dumping margin.'
In so holding, the Federal Circuit rejected Commerce's appli-
cation of the circumstance-of-sale provision7 as authority for
deducting the amount of the tax from FMV.
While Zenith settled the major issue of which side of the
FMV-USP equation Commerce must make its tax adjustment,
it left unsettled the exact amount of tax which Commerce must
add to USP in order to make the equation a fair comparison of
1. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Daewoo Elecs. v. International Union of Elec., Electrical, Technical Salaried and
Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO, 6 F.3d 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
2. See Torrington Co. v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 446 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1994); Hyster Co. v. United States, 848 F. Supp. 178 (Ct. Intl Trade 1994); Feder-
al-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 1391, 1397 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993),
affd, Nos. 91-07-00530, 91-08-00569, 1994 WL 50290 (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 14,
1994).
3. American Alloys, Inc. v. United States, 30 F.3d 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
4. 988 F.2d at 1573.
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C) (1988).
6. Zenith, 988 F.2d at 1580.
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(B) (1988).
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the respective home market and U.S. prices. In a subsequent
Federal Circuit decision, Daewoo Electronics v. International
Union of Electronic, Electrical, Technical Salaried and Ma-
chine Workers, AFL-CIO,' the appellate court sustained
Commerce's calculation of the amount of tax to be added to
USP as based on the point in the chain of commerce in the
Korean home market where tax authorities would have applied
the Korean tax on the exported merchandise, had their prac-
tice been to tax such merchandise Several subsequent CIT
decisions have confirmed this approach. °
The Federal Circuit addressed another VAT tax conun-
drum in the "tax pass-through" portion of the Daewoo decision.
The court held that Commerce need not conduct an
econometric analysis of tax incidence in foreign markets when
it decides whether it may add to USP the full amount of for-
eign taxes levied upon merchandise sold in the home market
but forgiven upon export to the United States." The CIT had
held that § 1677a(d)(1)(C) of the U.S. Code, which allows aug-
mentation of USP "only to the extent that such taxes are add-
ed to or included in the price of such or similar merchandise
when sold in the country of exportation, "" required the Inter-
national Trade Administration (ITA) to analyze the consumer
tax incidence or "pass through" of the commodity taxes."
8. 6 F.3d 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2672 (1994).
9. Id. at 1519-20.
10. See Avesta Sheffield, Inc. v. United States, 838 F. Supp. 608 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1993) (remanding the case to Commerce to calculate the amount to add to
USP in accordance with the Federal-Mogul rationale); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. Unit-
ed States, 834 F. Supp. 1391, 1397 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993), affd, Nos. 91-07-00530,
91-08-059, 1994 WL 50290 (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 14, 1994) (ordering Commerce to
"apply the Japanese VAT rate to USP calculated at the same point in the stream
of commerce where the Japanese VAT is applied for home market sales and add
the resulting amount to USP"); see also Torrington Co. v. United States, 853 F.
Supp. 446 (Ct. Intl Trade 1994) (affirming Commerces calculation of the VAT tax
adjustment by adding to USP the result of multiplying the foreign market tax rate
by the price of the United States merchandise at the same point in the chain of
commerce that the foreign market tax was applied to foreign market sales, and by
adjusting the USP tax adjustment and the amount of tax included in FMV to
account for certain expenses included in FMV and USP which might otherwise
create margins where none would exist if no taxes were levied upon foreign mar-
ket sales); Hyster Co. v. United States, 848 F. Supp. 178 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994)
(remanding to Commerce for adjustment to USP consistent with Zenith).
11. Daewoo, 6 F.3d at 1513-19.
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C) (1988).
13. Daewoo, 6 F.3d at 1513.
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Commerce had done so by using an econometric study of the
foreign market. The Federal Circuit rejected this approach as
insufficiently supported by the statute or its legislative history,
and deferred to Commerce's original, reasonable interpretation
of the statute as allowing the "accounting" method of verifying
that the taxes were in fact added to or included in the price of
the merchandise sold in the home country.14
Finally, the Federal Circuit spoke to a related VAT tax
issue in American Alloys, Inc. v. United States.5 In that case,
the court interpreted the statute6 as requiring Commerce,
before it adds foreign domestic taxes rebated upon export to
U.S. price, to determine that the taxes were imposed "directly"
upon the exported goods.' The Court's opinion arose from an
antidumping investigation concerning silicon metal from Ar-
gentina and, in particular, Argentina's "Reembolso" program of
rebates on, or waivers of, taxes assessed on exported goods
that are also assessed on domestic goods.'"
The court noted Commerce's practice of conducting a
"physical incorporation" inquiry of domestic taxes at issue in
countervailing duties cases and stated that it made little sense
not to do the same under the parallel antidumping law. 9 In
addition, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its earlier decision not
requiring Commerce to measure tax incidence (tax pass-
through) by means of an econometric study before making an
upward adjustment to U.S. price for such taxes. 9
III. "BEST INFORMATION AVAHABLE" CASES
In two related cases, the Federal Circuit addressed
Commerce's new "two-tier" best information available (BIA)
policy; subsequent CIT decisions have addressed the matter as
well.
In Allied-Signal Aerospace Co. v. United States,"' the Fed-
eral Circuit affirmed Commerce's two-tier best information
14. Id. at 1514-16.
15. 30 F.3d 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C) (1988).
17. American Alloys, 30 F.3d at 1472-73.
18. Id. at 1471.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1474-75.
21. 996 F.2d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Allied Signal 1].
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available policy for use in administrative reviews of
antidumping orders as a reasonable interpretation of the stat-
ute.22 The use of BIA arises when Commerce is unable to veri-
fy the accuracy of the information it receives or "whenever a
party or any other person refuses or is unable to produce infor-
mation requested in a timely manner and in the form required,
or otherwise significantly impedes an investigation."23
Commerce's new two-tier methodology distinguished be-
tween companies which refused to cooperate with the
Department's requests for information, as opposed to those
which substantially cooperated, but nonetheless failed to pro-
vide the requested information. The rate chosen in an adminis-
trative review for the former group was the most adverse mar-
gin of the possible choices, whereas that for the latter group
was adverse, but less so.24 The Federal Circuit upheld the
new methodology taking into account a respondent's degree of
cooperation as a reasonable and permissible exercise of
Commerce's statutory authority.' Nevertheless Commerce
contended, on the facts of the case, that the respondent had
provided so little information that it was not cooperative.26
The court disagreed and found that the respondent had tried to
provide the requested information to the extent it could. It
therefore remanded the case for further proceedings. A re-
lated case, Allied-Signal Aerospace Co. v. United States,2" like-
wise involved the Federal Circuit's affirmance of Commerce's
two-tier BIA methodology in administrative reviews. In partic-
ular, the court rejected Allied-Signal's argument that Com-
merce was required to provide a "reasoned analysis" justifying
its departure from established agency practice concerning BIA
for nonresponsive parties. 9
22. Id. at 1192.
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) (1988).
24. Allied Signal I, 996 F.2d at 1190-91. As "first tier" BIA, Commerce selects
the higher of the highest rate assigned for any firm in the less-than-fair-value
(LTFV) investigation or the highest rate calculated in the review. As "second tier"
BIA, Commerce selects the higher of the respondent's own prior LTFV rate or the
highest rate calculated in the current administrative review. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1192-93.
27. Id. at 1193.
28. 28 F.3d 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3295
(U.S. Sept. 26, 1994) (No. 94-542) [hereinafter Allied Signal 11].
29. Id. at 1191. For recent CIT BIA cases of note see Persico Pizzamiglio, S.A.
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IV. "SCOPE" CASES OF INTEREST
The Federal Circuit handed down two scope cases in June
of 1993.3" In NTN Bearing Corp. v. United States,3 the court
affirmed the CIT's holding that Commerce's inclusion of im-
ported bearing components within the scope of an antidumping
duty order on antifriction bearings from Japan was supported
by substantial evidence on the record and in accordance with
the law. 2 The components were properly included within the
scope because they had no independent application other than
to be combined and further refined into completed bearings."
In addition, the Federal Circuit upheld Commerce's application
of the same dumping margin to the imported components as to
the assembled bearings.34 Commerce had tried to calculate
separate margins for the components, but the data proved
unreliable."
In Nitta Industries Corp. v. United States,"5 the Federal
Circuit upheld the CIT's affirmance of Commerce's scope ruling
that nylon core flat belts were properly included within an
antidumping duty order covering industrial belts used for pow-
er transmission. 7 The court agreed with Commerce's analysis
that the written descriptions of the product were sufficiently
clear that further analysis under the criteria developed in
Diversified Products Corp. v. United States" were not neces-
sary.3
9
Another scope case handed down by the CIT last year was
v. United States, No. 94-61 (Ct. Int'l Trade Apr. 14, 1994) (sustaining Commerce's
application of "cooperative" BIA and rejecting plaintiffs contention that its coopera-
tion should obviate any use of BIA); Krupp Stahl, A.G. v. United States, 822 F.
Supp. 789 (Ct. Intl Trade 1993) (sustaining Commerce's use of the petition-based
dumping margin as BIA in the administrative review).
30. NTN Bearing Corp. v. United States, 997 F.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Nitta Indus. Corp. v. United States, 997 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
31. 997 F.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
32. Id. at 1457-58.
33. Id. at 1458.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 997 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
37. Id. at 1462-63.
38. 6 Ct, Int'l Trade 155 (1983). The "Diversified Products" criteria include
physical appearance of the merchandise, ultimate use, expectations of the ultimate
purchaser, or channels of trade. Id.
39. Nitta Indus., 997 F.2d at 1464.
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Smith Corona Corp. v. United States.4" The CIT upheld, as in
accordance with law, Commerce's interpretation of the
anticircumvention statute as requiring it first to determine
whether the difference in value between completed portable
electric typewriters and parts was "small."' If the difference
was small, Commerce had discretion to include the parts and
components within the antidumping order, taking into account
the factors set forth in the statute.42 In addition, the court
affirmed Commerce's exclusion of third-country parts from its
calculation of the "small" value difference between parts and
completed typewriters.4" The CIT held that consideration of
the Japanese content of parts produced in Malaysia was not
required by the statute,' which addresses a comparison of
the value of merchandise sold in the U.S. with parts or compo-
nents produced in the foreign country (Japan) to which the
antidumping order applies.45
Finally, the CIT addressed the coverage of an antidumping
order on cellular mobile telephones (CMTs) from Japan in
Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. United States,46
and a second case of the same name. In Ericsson I, the CIT
reversed and vacated Commerce's determination concerning
nine of eleven products at issue and remanded the case to
Commerce to determine whether use of "two duplexers in a
'booster,'... constituted a non-CMT use."48 When Commerce
answered affirmatively, the court remained unconvinced, hold-
ing that the agency had unlawfully expanded the scope of the
CMT order, which included subassemblies which transmitted
calls but not, the court found, signals.49 Since a booster can
only transmit signals, the CIT reversed the agency.5"
40. 811 F. Supp. 692 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993).
41. Id. at 694.
42. Id; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(a)(2) (1988).
43. Smith Corona, 811 F. Supp. at 695.
44. 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(a)(1)(B) (1988).
45. Smith Corona, 811 F. Supp. at 695.
46. 825 F. Supp. 1085 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993) [hereinafter Ericsson 1].
47. Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. United States, 850 F. Supp.
34 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994) [hereinafter Ericsson Ill.
48. Id. at 35.
49. Id. at 37-38.
50. Id. at 38.
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V. CHINA CASES OF INTEREST
In Lasko Metal Products v. United States,"' the CIT af-
firmed Commerce's "mix-and-match" methodology for valuing
factors of production in an antidumping investigation involving
a non-market economy (NME).5" The court examined the rele-
vant part of the statute which provides for special methods to
calculate foreign market value for NMEs when insufficient
information exists to allow foreign market value to be calculat-
ed by the usual methods. 3 In such a case, Commerce applies
a "factors of production" approach using surrogate country
values to build up an estimated foreign market value.' The
"[s]urrogate values reflect the cost of producing goods in one or
more market economy countries that are (A) at a level of eco-
nomic development comparable to that of non-market economy
country, and (B) significant producers of comparable merchan-
dise.""5 In this case involving ceiling fans from the People's
Republic of China, Commerce based its calculations both on
information from surrogate countries (Pakistan and/or India)
and on prices paid by Chinese manufacturers for raw materials
imported from market economy countries.
In interpreting the statute, the court noted its purpose:
'"With respect to NME goods, the statute's goal is to determine
what the cost of producing such goods would be in a market
economy."" The court acknowledged that an alternative inter-
pretation of the statute could be that, once Commerce resorts
to surrogate country values, it must abandon market prices.57
However, such a reading would conflict with the overall pur-
poses of the statute. The CIT therefore affirmed Commerce's
use of both market economy and non-market economy informa-
tion to value the factors of production needed to calculate for-
eign market value.58
A further opportunity for the CIT to address antidumping
51. 16 Ct. Intl Trade 1079 (1992).
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1988)).
54. Id. at 1080.
55. Lasko Metal Prods. v. United States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 1079, 1081 (1992)
(citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4) (1988)).
56. Id. (citing Tianjin Mach. Import & Export Corp. v. United States, 16 Ct.
Int'l Trade 931, 940 (1992)).
57. Id. at 1082.
58. Id. at 1079.
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issues concerning China arose from consecutive administrative
reviews on iron construction castings in two cases called Sigma
Corp. v. United States.9 In Sigma I, the CIT addressed a host
of issues, which we touch upon here. The court affirmed the
agency's use of the Philippines as a surrogate country with an
economy "comparable" to that of China, even though the Phil-
ippines did not necessarily have the most comparable econo-
my.60 The court adopted Commerce's rationale that companies
in non-market economy countries are presumed to be part of a
state-controlled operation, but explicitly held that the pre-
sumption can be rebutted by affirmative evidence, which it is
the exporter's burden to produce, proving the company's
independence.6 ' If the exporter can prove it meets the criteria
which the court, citing Commerce, outlined, then it will be
eligible for separate, company-specific dumping rates. 2 How-
ever, the case was remanded to provide the exporter the oppor-
tunity to submit additional evidence of independence on
grounds of procedural unfairness.'
In Sigma II, the CIT likewise addressed a host of issues.
In particular, the court remanded to Commerce for reconsider-
ation the question of the agency's use of Indian pig iron and
scrap iron prices as a surrogate for Chinese prices." The
court was not convinced by the agency's arguments against the
plaintiffs' claims that Indian government subsidies and in-
volvement in the pig iron and scrap iron industry rendered
Indian prices inappropriate surrogates.65 On the other hand,
the court did affirm the agency's use of the Indian "official"
price for coke.66 As in Sigma I, the CIT approved of
59. 841 F. Supp. 1255 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993) [hereinafter Sigma 1]; 841 F.
Supp. 1275 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993) [hereinafter Sigma Ill.
60. Sigma I, 841 F. Supp. at 1259-60.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1266 n.3. The court cited the "Sparklers" test requiring an exporter
to demonstrate "an absence of central government control, both in law and in fact,
with respect to exports." Id. (citation omitted).
"Evidence supporting de jure absence of central control includes: (1) absence
of restrictive stipulations on individual exporter's business and export licenses; (2)
legislative enactments decentralizing control of companies; or (3) formal measures
by the government decentralizing control of the government." Id. (citation omitted).
63. Id. at 1274.
64. Sigma II, 841 F. Supp. 1275, 1280 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993).
65. Id. at 1279.
66. Id. at 1279-80.
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Commerce's criteria for determining whether a Chinese export-
er is independent from central government control, but held
that Commerce had not given adequate notice to one particular
exporter, a subsidiary of a Beijing company, such that it did
not receive the chance to prove its independence from central
government control."
VI. BURDEN OF PROOF/STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Creswell Trading Co. v. United States,"8 the Federal
Circuit addressed the appropriate burdens of proof and pro-
duction to be applied in a countervailing duty inquiry concern-
ing "Item (d)" of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies of the
GATT "Subsidies Code."69 The court first recognized, however,
that the standard of review which it, as well as the CIT, is
bound by law to apply is whether Commerce's determination is
"unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or other-
wise not in accordance with law."7" While the Federal Circuit
did not elucidate the difference between standard of review
and burden of proof here, it has in the past taken great care to
distinguish between these two concepts. 1
67. Id. at 1281-82; see also D & L Supply Co. v. United States, 841 F. Supp.
1312 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993) (concerning similar issues) [hereinafter Sigma III].
68. 15 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1056 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1988)); see also id. at 1062,
1063.
71. See, e.g., SSIH Equip. SA. v. U.S. International Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d
365, 379-83 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (addressing the "recurring confusion" between "stan-
dards of proof at the trial level and standards of review at the appellate level").
Standards of proof, Judge Nies explained, concern the "particular quantum or
burden of proof at the trial level" (such as preponderance of evidence, clear and
convincing proof, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt), and are generally a
'Judge-made requirement shaped in accordance with considerations of due process
and/or the importance of certain facts"). Id. at 380. Standards of review are usual-
ly statutorily imposed. Id. at 381. The most common are: de novo, clearly erro-
neous, supported by substantial evidence, and arbitrary or capricious. Judge Nies
explained the relationship between the two concepts as follows:
While the standard of review and the standard of proof are dis-
tinct concepts, nevertheless, the degree of proof below affects the appel-
late decision whether to affirm or reverse, regardless of what standard of
review is applicable. For example, in reviewing whether the evidence
supports a finding of fact on a "clearly erroneous" standard, the decision
might be affirmed if the standard of proof below were "weight of evi-
dence" and might be reversed on the same record if the standard of proof
were "clear and convincing" evidence. Thus, the appellate court must first
focus on what support is needed for the trial court determination and
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With this distinction in mind, the Federal Circuit in
Creswell held that Commerce committed a procedural error
justifying reversal and remand when it failed to come forward
with evidence demonstrating that international benchmark
prices which the Indian government had provided regarding its
International Price Reimbursement Scheme (IPRS) for export-
ers of iron-metal castings were in fact inaccurate.72 The court
examined Item (d) and held that the "if' clause of that provi-
sion set forth a statutory condition that Commerce must estab-
lish before it may levy a countervailing duty against an inves-
tigated party.73 The mere existence of the IPRS program, the
court explained, created a presumption of countervailability
under Item (d) which shifted to the exporters the burden of
coming forward with evidence that the input product (pig iron)
was not provided to them at prices more favorable than those
on the world market.74 In the court's view, the evidence the
exporters presented was sufficient to shift the burden back to
Commerce to establish the existence of a subsidy by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.75 Commerce failed in this particular
instance, the court held, so that substantial evidence on the
record that the program was countervailable was lacking.76
The Federal Circuit therefore remanded the case for this rea-
son and for an additional point concerning procedural
unfairness.77
then review, in accordance with the standard of review permitted in the
type of case, whether that finding is properly supported. For example, in
applying the substantial evidence standard of review (i.e., the reasonable-
ness of the lower decision), the appellate court in Whitney v. SEC, 604
F.2d 676, 681 (D.C.Cir. 1979), correctly, in my view, stated its function to
be: "We review the Commission's findings only to ascertain whether . . .
there is evidence which a reasonable person might find clear and con-
vincing."
Id. at 383.
72. Creswell Trading Co., 15 F.3d at 1054.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1061.
75. Id. at 1062.
76. Id. at 1061. Note that, in instances other than the Item (d) matter before
the Federal Circuit in Creswell, the burden of proof lies on the responding party.
See, e.g., International Trade Administration, Commerce, 19 C.F.R. § 353.54 (1994)
(requiring that any interested party claiming an adjustment to foreign market
value (differences in quantity, differences in circumstances of sale, differences in
physical characteristics, and level of trade) must establish its claim to the satis-
faction of Commerce).
77. Id.
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VII. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
The Federal Circuit's decision in Belton Industries, Inc. v.
United States"5 and the Court of International Trade's deci-
sions in Kemira Fibres Oy v. United States,9 Hosiden Corp. v.
United States," and Industria de Fundicao Tupy v. United
States8 emphasize the importance of Commerce's procedural
regulations. In Belton Industries, the Federal Circuit upheld
the CIT's determination in finding that Commerce did not
properly provide notice to interested parties in accordance with
its regulations."2 Strictly reading the code,8" the Federal Cir-
cuit held that Commerce violated its regulations by failing to
notify each interested party in writing of its intent to revoke
certain countervailing duty (CVD) orders and to terminate
certain suspension agreements under § 353.25(d)(4) of
Commerce's regulations.' However, the Federal Circuit found
that because the interested parties' counsel happened to have
received actual notice of Commerce's intent, Commerce's viola-
tion was harmless error.8 5
While Belton Industries strictly held Commerce to the
notification standard in § 353.25(d)(4) to inform interested
parties of its intent to revoke, Kemira Fibres Oy strictly held
interested parties to the notification standard in § 353.25(d)(4)
to inform Commerce of objections to its intent to revoke.86 The
CIT held that because no interested party objected to revoca-
tion of the finding of antidumping or requested an administra-
tive review by the last day of the fifth anniversary month as
required under § 353.25(d)(4)(iii), Commerce must revoke the
Treasury finding." Even though Commerce did not publish its
notice of intent to revoke under § 353.25(d)(4)(i) until two
78. 6 F.3d 756 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
79. No. 94-139 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 8, 1994).
80. No. 94-128 (Ct. InVI Trade Aug. 12, 1994).
81. No. 94-156 (Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 6, 1994).
82. Belton Indus., 6 F.3d at 761.
83. International Trade Administration, Commerce, 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(d)(4)(ii)
(1994).
84. Belton Indus., 6 F.3d at 761-62 (citing International Trade Administration,
Commerce, 19 CIF.R. § 353.25(d)(4) (1994)).
85. Id. at 762.
86. Kemira Fibres Oy v. United States, No. 94-139, slip op. at 13-14 (Ct. Int'l
Trade Sept. 8, 1994) (citing International Trade Administration, Commerce, 19
C.F.R. § 353.25(d)(4) (1994)).
87. Id. at 16-17.
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months after the last day of the fifth anniversary month, the
CIT determined that interested parties should still have filed
objections by the last day of the fifth anniversary month in
accordance with § 353.25(d)(4)(iii).88
The CIT focused exclusively on the requirements of para-
graph (iii) of § 353.25(d)(4), which the CIT states "places the
domestic industry on notice that, when four consecutive anni-
versary months have passed without any request for adminis-
trative review, it must register its interest in an outstanding
order by a particular date either through objection to revoca-
tion or by requesting administrative review."89 Accordingly,
pursuant to § 353.25(d)(4)(iii), Commerce must revoke an order
or finding if, by the last day of the fifth anniversary month, no
interested party objects to revocation or requests an adminis-
trative review, regardless of whether or when Commerce pub-
lished a notice of intent to revoke the order."
In Fundicao Tupy, the plaintiffs, citing the CIT's holding
in Kemira Fibres Oy, filed a motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion to enjoin Commerce from conducting an administrative
review of the antidumping duty order at issue.9 As discussed
below, because the CIT found there was no likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits, which is one of the elements plaintiffs must
establish in order for a preliminary injunction to issue, the CIT
denied the motion.92 The plaintiffs argued that Commerce was
barred from conducting an administrative review because Com-
merce violated § 353.25(d)(4)(i)93 regarding several publi-
cations of the "Notice of Intent to Revoke Order," and because
the domestic industry violated § 353.25(d)(4)(iii) regarding
interested parties' obligation to request administrative reviews
and to object to notices of intent to revoke.94 The CIT primari-
ly held that the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action
against Commerce because they did not timely file for judicial
88. Id. at 11-13.
89. Id. at 11.
90. Id. at 11-12.
91. Industria de Fundicao Tupy v. United States, No. 94-156, slip op. at 2, 10
(Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 6, 1994).
92. Id. at 7, 20.
93. International Trade Administration, Commerce, 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(d)(4)(i)
(1994).
94. Id. at 10-13.
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appeals under either § 1581(c) or § 1581(i) of the U.S. Code.95
The CIT noted that, had the plaintiffs filed a timely ap-
peal, jurisdiction under § 1581(i) would have been proper, even
though such jurisdiction may only be invoked where the reme-
dy under § 1581(c) is unavailable or the remedy provided by
that subsection would be manifestly inadequate." The CIT
seemed to find that the remedy under § 1581(c) would have
been manifestly inadequate, because if the plaintiffs were
required to participate in an administrative review in order to
invoke the CIT's jurisdiction under § 1581(c), the plaintiffs'
challenge with regard the legality of the review would be
moot.97 The CIT distinguished Kemira Fibres Oy from
Fundicao Tupy in that, unlike Kemira Fibres Oy, the Fundicao
Tupy plaintiffs had an agency determination before them that
could have properly been appealed." The CIT also noted that
Commerce's publication of the notices of intent to revoke 1 and
2 days late was still within a reasonable amount of time to
publish in the appropriate anniversary month.99
In Hosiden Corp., the CIT granted plaintiff Sharp's Motion
for a Writ of Mandamus to Enforce Judgment, thereby requir-
ing Commerce to revoke the antidumping duty order on EL
High Information Content Flat Panel Displays and Display
Glass Therefor from Japan in accordance with the CIT's deci-
sion affirming a negative injury determination by the Inter-
national Trade Commission on remand.00 Since the Federal
Circuit's decision in Timken Co. v. United States, °' when ah
adverse court decision is issued, Commerce's practice has been
to publish notice of the adverse CIT decision within ten days of
the issuance of that CIT decision and to continue suspension of
liquidation of the entries until the matter is decided by the
Federal Circuit or until the time for appeal has expired.0 2
Commerce preserves the status quo in all other respects. The
95. Id. at 15-16 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(c), (i) (1988)).
96. Id.
97. Industria de Fundicao Tupy v. United States, No. 94-156, slip op. at 15-16
(Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 6, 1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. §1581(c) (1988)).
98. Id. at 16.
99. Id. at 12-13.
100.: Hosiden Corp. v. United States, No. 94-128, slip op. at 11 (Ct. Int'l Trade
Aug. 12, 1994).
101. 893 F.2d 337 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
102. Hosiden Corp., No. 94-128, slip op. at 11.
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CIT decision in Timken necessitates that Commerce change its
practice in factual situations where, unlike in Timken, the CIT
affirms a negative agency determination that was formerly an
affirmative one in the original agency determination.1
3
The CIT distinguished the Timken decision in Hosiden
Corp. In Timken, the CIT affirmed an affirmative agency de-
termination on remand that was originally a negative deter-
mination, whereas in Hosiden Corp., the CIT, on remand, af-
firmed a negative agency determination that was originally an
affirmative determination.' As in Hosiden Corp., the CIT
held that Commerce's legal obligations are not limited to in-
structing the U.S. Customs Service to continue the suspension
of liquidation, but also include: (1) immediately instructing
Customs to cease collection of cash deposits previously collect-
ed, to refund cash deposits previously collected, and to release
any bonds; (2) refraining from further action with respect to
any administrative review relating to EL displays from Japan;
and (3) revoking the antidumping duty order, effective as of
the date of Commerce's publication of its preliminary determi-
nation of sales at less-than-fair-value (LTFV).'05 Commerce
must still publish notice of the adverse CIT decision within ten
days of the decision.0 6
The CIT stated that when Commerce publishes notice of
the adverse court decision, such notification serves to "signal
an end to the controlling effect of an agency determination,
notwithstanding the unexpired period to file an appeal, or the
actual pendency of appellate review. "' °' Because the Timken
court "emphatically stated that it would be 'nonsensical' to say
that a CIT decision entering final judgment does not exist and
has no effect until the time for appeal expires or the action is
finally and conclusively resolved,"' 8 the CIT in Hosiden
Corp. disagreed with Commerce's interpretation of the Federal
Circuit's decision in Timken as not requiring implementation of
the adverse CIT decision. 10 9
103. Id. at 11.
104. Id. at 7-8.
105. Id. at 10.
106. Id. at 11.
107. Id. at 8-9.
108. Id. at 8.
109. Id. at 9.
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The Federal Circuit in Minebea Co. v. United States"0 af-
firmed the CIT's decision upholding Commerce's determination
that a petition for antidumping duties was filed "on behalf of'
the domestic industry as required by 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1)
(1988)."' Although petitioner stated that it was an interested
party filing the petition on behalf of the domestic industry,
several parties challenged petitioner's standing to file the peti-
tion alleging that it did not file "on behalf of' the domestic
industry as required by § 1673a(b)(1)."' Citing to Suramerica
de Aleaciones Laminadas C.A. v. United States,"1 the Federal
Circuit held that Commerce has broad discretion in determin-
ing whether to initiate an investigation based on a petition
filed on behalf of an industry." In essence, the Federal Cir-
cuit validated Commerce's practice of presuming a petitioner
has standing unless a majority of the domestic industry active-
ly opposes the petition, and noted that this practice is a rea-
sonable implementation of Commerce's discretion." 5
The CIT's decision in Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United
States"6 effectively restricts Commerce's administrative au-
thority. The CIT held that Commerce may not correct ministe-
rial errors in those final determinations which have been ap-
pealed."7 The CIT found that the filing of a summons "vests
the court with exclusive jurisdiction over the challenged ad-
ministrative review."' Accordingly, when parties raise min-
isterial errors after a summons has been filed with the CIT,
Commerce must obtain leave from the CIT to correct the er-
rors.
VIII. TAPERED ROLLER BEARING CASES
Commerce has long compared individual U.S. sales prices
to an annual-average FMV to calculate antidumping margins
in tapered roller bearing cases. The Federal Circuit in Koyo
110. 984 F.2d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
111. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) (1988)).
112. Id. at 1180-81.
113. 966 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
114. Minebea Co. v. United States, 984 F.2d 1178, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
115. Id.
116. 16 Ct. Intl Trade 975 (1992).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 981 (citing Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 884 F.2d 556, 561
(Fed. Cir. 1989)).
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Seiko Co. v. United States". affirmed Commerce's practice in
this regard.
In its argument to the Federal Circuit, Koyo asserted that
Commerce erred in only averaging FMV rather than U.S. price
also because the goal of the antidumping statute was to com-
pare "apples to apples."2 ° Koyo further argued that a com-
parison of individual U.S. prices to an annual average FMV
would result in margins which may be "unrepresentative of the
true situation." 2' The Federal Circuit held that Commerce
acted reasonably in deciding to weight-average FMV only.'22
Citing to 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1 (1988),12 the Federal Cir-
cuit explained that the language in the statute stating that
"averages shall be representative of the transactions under
investigation"'24 does not necessarily require that the mar-
gins calculated be representative of the transactions under
consideration, but rather that the home market and U.S. sales
examined be representative of the transactions under consider-
ation.'25 The Federal Circuit stressed that by using individu-
al U.S. prices, Commerce identifies respondents who intermit-
tently sell merchandise below fair market value.2 ' The Fed-
eral Circuit explained that if an average U.S. price was em-
ployed, dumping may go undetected because the calculation
combines the higher sales prices with the lower sales pric-
es."' The Federal Circuit noted, however, that Commerce
119. 20 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Koyo 11.
120. Id. at 1158 (citing Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1983)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1159.
123. The text of this provision states in pertinent part:
(a) For the purpose of determining United States price or foreign
market value under sections 1677a and 1677b of this title, and for pur-
poses of carrying out annual reviews under section 1675 of this title, the
administering authority may - (1) use averaging or generally recognized
sampling techniques whenever a significant volume of sales is involved or
a significant number of adjustments to prices is required ....
(b) The authority to select appropriate samples and averages shall
rest exclusively with the administering authority; but such samples and
averages shall be representative of the transactions under investigation.
19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1 (1988) (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1156, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
126. Id. at 1159.
127. Id.
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may average U.S. prices under special circumstances such as
those circumstances involving perishable products."8 In in-
stances when the product is nearly unsalable, and merchants
must sell the products at unusually low prices, a more repre-
sentative price would be an average U.S. price.'29
Of note is the Federal Circuit's interpretation of Smith-
Corona Group v. United States.8" The Federal Circuit ex-
plained that Smith-Corona Group stands for the proposition
that Commerce has discretion in calculating dumping margins,
not that U.S. prices and FMV must be treated in a similar
manner when calculating margins.1
31
The CIT decision in Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States"1
2
required Commerce to alter its "sum of the deviations" model
matching methodology which Commerce employs in order to
identify similar merchandise in the home market.113 During
the administrative review, Commerce selected the most similar
home market model to compare to the U.S. model in accor-
dance with its sum of the deviations methodology."14 This
methodology requires Commerce to evaluate five physical char-
acteristics of home market models in conjunction with a 20%
variable cost of manufacture "cap."" 5 If the deviation in vari-
able cost of manufacturing between the most similar pair of
U.S. and home market models based on the five physical char-
acteristics is less than 20%, then Commerce matches those
models for comparison purposes."3 However, the CIT in Koyo
11 held that, in addition, if a U.S. model differs from a pro-
posed home market model by more than 10% on any one of the
physical criteria, that match cannot be used."7 Moreover,
Koyo II requires the "10% criterion cap" to be employed in con-
junction with Commerce's 20% variable cost of manufacturing
cap because, in this manner, Commerce "avoids comparisons
between products which differ so dramatically that they simply
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
131. Koyo I, 20 F.3d at 1159.
132. 834 F. Supp. 431 (Ct. InVI Trade 1993) [hereinafter Koyo I1].
133. Id. at 435.
134. Id. at 435-36.
135. Id. at 435.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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cannot be considered commercially similar." 8'
Commerce has appealed this decision to the Federal Cir-
cuit arguing, inter alia, that the 10% cap is too restrictive,
since it results in the elimination of potential matches of mod-
els which are overall most similar to the U.S. models.3 9 Such
an elimination of potential matches also requires Commerce to
more frequently resort to constructed value, instead of price-to-
price comparisons, as the basis for FMV.
The Federal Circuit's decision in Koyo Seiko Co. v. United
States' sustained Commerce's treatment of U.S. direct sell-
ing expenses in exporter sales price (ESP) transactions.'
Specifically, the issue raised before the Federal Circuit was
whether Commerce should adjust for U.S. direct selling ex-
penses incurred on ESP sales pursuant to the "circumstance of
sale" provision contained in § 1677b(a)(4) or whether Com-
merce should adjust for these selling expenses pursuant to the
ESP provision contained in § 1677a(e)(2). In the final re-
sult, pursuant to § 1677a(e)(2), Commerce deducted from ESP
both indirect and direct selling expenses incurred in making
the U.S. sales. Koyo argued that Commerce erred in deducting
Koyo's direct selling expenses from the ESP rather than add-
ing the direct selling expenses to FMV pursuant to the "cir-
cumstance of sale" provision.' However, after examining the
legislative history, the Federal Circuit found that the statutory
provisions at issue do not preclude direct selling expense ad-
justments under the ESP provision.'" In addition, the Feder-
al Circuit found that Commerce's practice attempts to make
"mirror-image" adjustments to FMV and ESP were attempts to
make "apples to apples" comparisons.' Therefore, the Feder-
al Circuit held that Commerce's practice should be sustained
as reasonable.'46
138. Id.
139. Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, No. 94-123 (Federal Circuit Sept. 30,
1994) [hereinafter Koyo III].
140. Id.
141. Id. at 19-20.
142. Id. at 11-12.
143. Id. at 10-12.
144. Id. at 12.
145. Id. at 14-15.
146. Id.
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IX. "ALL OTHERS RATE/NEW SHIPPER RATE" CASES
The CIT, in Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States47 and
Floral Trade Council v. United States,4 ' prescribed the meth-
odology Commerce must now employ in calculating the rate for
"new shippers" in administrative reviews. This methodology,
allowing Commerce to adopt a unitary rate based on the "all
others" rate of "old shippers," instead of using a multi-tiered
rate based on date of entry, was subsequently affirmed by the
CIT in Jeumont Schneider Transformateurs v. United
States.
149
During the administrative proceeding of Certain Fresh Cut
Flowers from Mexico,"' Commerce applied the only positive
rate calculated in the review to all shippers, both old and new,
who did not receive an individual rate. In Floral Trade Coun-
cil, however, the CIT held that Commerce must instead apply
the "all-other" cash deposit rate calculated during the LTFV
investigation to all companies which did not receive an individ-
ual rate in the administrative review. 5' As a basis for its
holding, the CIT cited to the legislative history of Commerce's
statute which states that Commerce "should provide by regula-
tion for the assessment of antidumping and countervailing
duties on entries for which review is not requested, includ-
ing ... the conversion of cash deposits of estimated duties,
previously ordered."'52 In addition, referring to Commerce's
implementing regulation, § 353.22(e), which states that Com-
merce will assess duties equal to the cash deposit rate for
unreviewed companies, the CIT found that Commerce's regula-
tion requires Commerce to apply the calculated "all-other" cash
deposit rate from the LTFV investigation to those shippers
without individual rates in an administrative review. 5 3
In Federal-Mogul Corp., the CIT similarly held that
§ 1675(a)(2) of the U.S. Code and § 353.22(e) of the Code of
Federal Regulations compel Commerce to automatically utilize
147. 822 F. Supp. 782 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993).
148. 822 F. Supp. 766 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993).
149. No. 94-137 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 1, 1994).
150. 57 Fed. Reg. 19,597 (1992).
151. 822 F. Supp. at 766.
152. Id. at 770 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5220, 5298).
153. Id. at 768-69 (citing International Trade Administration, Commerce, 19
C.F.R. § 353.22(e) (1994)).
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the "all-other" cash deposit rate from the LTFV investigation
as the cash deposit rate for companies which have not been
individually reviewed." The CIT explained that because par-
ties rely on existing cash deposit rates when deciding whether
or not to request a review, Commerce should not be allowed to
"arbitrarily change" the cash deposit rate in accordance with
an administrative review.' The CIT noted that to do other-
wise would increase the number of requests for reviews be-
cause foreign and domestic producers would respectively re-
quest reviews in order to ensure that future entries would not
be subject to potentially higher or lower "all-others" cash de-
posit rates. 55 The CIT added that such an increase in admin-
istrative reviews runs counter to Congress' intent in 1984 to
limit the number of reviews by amending the statute to require
conduct of an administrative review only upon request. 5 '
The CIT, in Jeumont Schneider, in effect affirmed
Commerce's practice of applying the LTFV "all-others" rate as
the assessment rate for those exporters and producers not
individually reviewed.'58  In deciding whether to affirm
Commerce's new methodology, the CIT was primarily con-
cerned with whether the plaintiff was prejudiced by the
"abrupt change in rates to the 'old shipper' rate" for new ship-
pers."'59 The CIT concluded that the plaintiff was not preju-
diced because: (1) the plaintiff had requested an administrative
review, and therefore would eventually receive an individually
calculated rate; (2) the plaintiffs first set of entries were liqui-
dated at the invalidated new shipper rate; and (3) the plaintiff
did not demonstrate any specific financial harm by the change
in deposit rate. 60
154. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 822 F. Supp. 782 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1993) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2) (1988) and International Trade Administration,
Commerce, 19 C.F.R. § 353.22(e) (1994)).
155. Id. at 788.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Jeumont Schneider Transformateurs v. United States, No. 94-137, slip op.
at 3-4 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 1, 1994).
159. Id. at 3.
160. Id. at 3-4.
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X. MISCELLANEOUS CASES OF INTEREST
A. Antidumping Cases
The Federal Circuit's decision in Ad Hoc Committee of AZ-
NM-TX-FL Producers of Gray Portland Cement v. United
States 6' invalidated Commerce's practice of deducting home
market pre-sale movement expenses from FMV when U.S.
price is based on purchase price transactions pursuant to
Commerce's inherent power as the administering authority to
fill in "gaps" in the statutory framework.'62 The Federal Cir-
cuit held that there is no "gap" in the statute, or in other
words, that the statute is not silent on this issue.'63 The Fed-
eral Circuit explained that since the deduction is included in
the provisions for USP but not in the FMV provisions, Con-
gress did not intend home market transportation costs to be
deducted from FMV.'" Therefore, the Federal Circuit con-
cluded that, pursuant to the statute, Commerce may not de-
duct such expenses from FMV. The Federal Circuit noted,
however, that it was leaving open the question as to whether
Commerce could deduct pre-sale home market movement ex-
penses under the "circumstance of sale" provision in the 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4) (1988).165
Although the Federal Circuit addressed the specific issue
of pre-sale home market transportation expenses in purchase
price situations, Commerce applied the Federal Circuit's hold-
ing to both pre-sale and post-sale home market movement
ekpenses in both ESP and PP situations because there is no
statutory provision explicitly authorizing the deduction of
home market movement expenses in any situation. According-
ly, consistent with Ad Hoc, Commerce adjusts for home market
movement expenses under the "circumstance of sale" provi-
sions 6 ' and the ESP provisions.'67
The significant issue addressed by the CIT in Independent
161. 13 F.3d 398 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 401.
164. Id. at 401-02.
165. Id. at 401 n.8.
166. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4) (1988); International Trade Administration, Com-
merce, 19 C.F.R. § 353.56 (1994).
167. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(2) (1988); International Trade Administration, Com-
merce, 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(b) (1994).
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Radionic Workers v. United States6 ' was whether Commerce
properly rejected Samsung's allocation of rebate expenses as
direct selling expenses where the rebates could not be tied to
specific sales made during the review period. Citing to Smith-
Corona Group v. United States,'69 the CIT held that appropri-
ate allocation methodologies do not "deprive... rebates of
their direct relationship to the sales under consideration."7 °
Therefore, the CIT held that if the following, factors are met
(factors based on Smith-Corona), Commerce must treat allocat-
ed rebate expenses as direct selling expenses: (1) the rebates
were actually paid, (2) the cost to the manufacturer was in-
creased by the amount of the rebate, and (3) the allocation was
made on the basis of actual, verified data. 7' However, the
CIT noted exceptions to the above requirements. The expenses
need not be classified as direct selling expenses if. (1) the
manufacturer's cost does not establish a direct link between
the rebate and the sale of the merchandise, and (2) the rebates
were not assessed as fixed percentage of sales.'72 Because
Samsung's rebate expenses met all of the aforementioned crite-
ria, the CIT held that Commerce erred in treating the rebate
expense as an indirect selling expense.
17 3
The CIT rejected Commerce's argument that the rebate
expenses could not be classified as direct selling expenses be-
cause the expenses could occur at any time subsequent to the
sales under review. ' The CIT found this rationale inconsis-
tent with Commerce's rationale with regard to warranty ex-
penses, which Commerce treats as direct selling expenses even
though they are incurred on sales made during prior peri-
ods. 75
B. CVD Cases
The CIT recently addressed whether countervailable subsi-
dies previously bestowed upon companies remain with them
168. No. 94-144, slip op. at 8 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 16, 1994).
169. 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
170. Independent Radionic Workers, No. 94-144, slip op. at 15.
171. Id. at 23.
172. Id. at 15.
173. Id. at 23.
174. Id. at 11.
175. Id. at 28-29.
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when they are "privatized" by their former government owners.
In Saarstahl AG v. United States..6 and Inland Steel Bar v.
United States,177 the CIT first affimed Commerce's determi-
nations that newly privatized companies in both the German
and U.K. lead bar investigations were the results of arm's-
length transactions between government entities and private
parties. However, the court vacated Commerce's determination
that previously bestowed subsidies "travel with" the privatized
companies to their new home, where they remain
countervailable under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a) and 1677(5)(A)
(1988).178 The court held that countervailable benefits due to
subsidies previously bestowed on the government-owned com-
panies do not survive the arm's-length transactions.'79 "[Olne
must conclude that the buyer and seller have negotiated in
their respective self-interests, the buyer has taken into consid-
eration all relevant facts, and the buyer has paid an amount
which represents the market value of all it is to receive."180
The privatization issue is also pending before the CIT in the
"big steel" litigation. 8'
In PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States,1 2 the Federal
Circuit addressed, among other issues, the question of "speci-
ficity" under the countervailing duty law. The issue arose from
a 1982 loan program of the Mexican government, Fidelicomiso
para la Cobertura de Riesgos Cambiarios (FICORCA), which
established a trust fund for Mexican firms with long-term
foreign debt for the coverage of exchange rate risks." The
CIT had upheld Commerce's determination that FICORCA was
not countervailable because its benefits were not provided to a
specific industry or group of enterprises or industries, as re-
quired under 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1988)."M The Federal Cir-
cuit agreed."
176. 858 F. Supp. 187 (Ct. Intl Trade 1994).
177. 858 F. Supp. 179 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Saarstahl AG, 858 F. Supp. at 193; Inland Steel Bar, 858 F. Supp. at
185.
181. See British Steel v. United States, Consol. Ct. No. 93-09-00550-CVD (gen-
eral issue of privatization and restructuring).
182. 978 F.2d 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
183. Id. at 1234-35.
184. Id. at 1236.
185. Id. at 1240-41 (citing PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 928 F.2d 1668
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The appellate court reiterated that at least three factors
must be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether a program is specific in its application: (1) the extent
to which the foreign government acted to limit availability of
the program; (2) the number of enterprises or industries which
actually use the program; and (3) the extent to which the for-
eign government exercises discretion in making the program
available." 6  The Court rejected PPG's contention that
Commerce's specificity finding was not supported by substan-
tial evidence on the record, based on new information about
the number of Mexican users which PPG had submitted to the
agency concerning the number of Mexican participants in the
program, the distribution of the benefits of the program, and
the Mexican government's alleged discretion in administering
the program. 7
Another recent CIT case concerning an interesting coun-
tervailing duty issue-the "benchmark rate" for subsidized
loans-is Royal Thai Government v. United States.8' In that
case, the Royal Thai Government provided exporters with low
interest, short-term loans at preferential rates under a pro-
gram called the "export packing credits" program.'89 To calcu-
late the benefit of what was an admitted subsidy, Commerce
would usually have compared the countervailable interest rate
to a benchmark rate reflecting the interest rate that a Thai
exporter, but for the program, would have incurred by obtain-
ing loans through private channels. 9 ' No single, predominant
source of short-term financing existed in Thailand, however, so
Commerce constructed a benchmark. 9' In so doing, the agen-
cy rejected a benchmark calculated by the Royal Thai Govern-
ment which it had previously used, a decision which the CIT
found, on the whole and after remand, to be supported by sub-
stantial evidence on the record.'92 The CIT likewise affirmed
Commerce's new benchmark methodology, following an analy-
sis of its basis, both in fact and in the agency's proposed regu-
(Fed. Cir. 1991)).
186. Id. at 1240-41.
187. PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 978 F.2d 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
188. 850 F. Supp. 44 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994).
189. Id. at 45.
190. Id. at 45.
191. Id. at 45-46.
192. Id. at 46, 48.
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lations.'9' Commerce relied upon Bank of Thailand Quarterly
Bulletins publishing minimum loan and overdraft rates to
determine which types of loans the agency found to account for
a "predominant" source of financing in Thailand.194
Finally, in Ceramica Regiomontana SA v. United
States,' the CIT addressed the issue of whether an injury
determination was required for Commerce to continue to im-
pose countervailing duties based on a CVD order issued before
the exporting country, Mexico, had become a "country under
the Agreement," i.e. the Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures "Subsidies Code" of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 9' The CVD order had been is-
sued in 1982, when Mexico was not a member of the Subsidies
Code and did not receive the benefit of the injury requirement
under the U.S. countervailing duty statute.9 7 On April 23,
1985, Mexico and the United States signed an Understanding
Regarding Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, which desig-
nated Mexico as a "country under the Agreement."' The CIT
analyzed the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions,
including the statutory "transitional rule," and affirmed as rea-
sonable Commerce's interpretation that the agency could con-
tinue to assess countervailing duties on imports of ceramic tile
from Mexico after April 23, 1985, even though no injury test
had been performed.'99
193. Id. at 49.
194. Id. at 49-50.
195. 853 F. Supp. 431 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994), appeal dismissed, 1994 WL
416446 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 5, 1994).
196. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671(b) (1988).
197. Ceramica Regiomontana, S., 853 F. Supp. at 432.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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